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1. INTRODUCTION
Passive safety systems are being considered in new
and advanced designs for enhanced safety and reliability,
and to reduce human intervention. Conventionally, passive
systems are incorporated to simplify the design by reliance
on natural physical laws, for transparent safety, to provide
an ample grace period for the operator, for ease of operation
and maintenance, etc. Moreover, for densely populated
countries, large-scale deployment of reactors in future
requires the designers to elevate the design goals, such as
having no impact in the public domain. This further rein-
forces the need for passive safety systems in advanced
reactors. The Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is
one such reactor with due emphasis on passive safety. It is
a pressure-tube type heavy water moderated and boiling
light water cooled reactor designed with the twin objectives
of thorium utilization and a demonstration of enhanced
safety derived from various passive features [1]. 
AHWR incorporates natural circulation for core heat
removal under all plausible conditions of a reactor, namely
startup, power rise, shutdown and accidental conditions,
including loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and station
black out (SBO). The design goals of AHWR include the
elimination of severe plant conditions, and hence emergency
preparedness by reliance on passive safety features resulting
in significantly improved figures of merit in terms of core
damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency
(LERF). This is achieved by incorporating the capability
to shutdown the reactor safely, remove decay heat safely
and maintain the integrity of the ultimate barrier that is
containment, even under the worst credible scenarios.
Pressing demands of economic competitiveness, the need for large-scale deployment, minimizing the need of human
intervention, and experience from the past events and incidents at operating reactors have guided the evolution and innovations
in reactor technologies. Indian innovative reactor ‘AHWR’ is a pressure-tube type natural circulation based boiling water
reactor that is designed to meet such requirements, which essentially reflect the needs of next generation reactors. The reactor
employs various passive features to prevent and mitigate accidental conditions, like a slightly negative void reactivity
coefficient, passive poison injection to scram the reactor in event of failure of the wired shutdown systems, a large elevated
pool of water as a heat sink inside the containment, passive decay heat removal based on natural circulation and passive
valves, passive ECC injection, etc. It is designed to meet the fundamental safety requirements of safe shutdown, safe decay
heat removal and confinement of activity with no impact in public domain, and hence, no need for emergency planning under
all conceivable scenarios. This paper examines the role of the various passive safety systems in prevention and mitigation of
severe plant conditions that may arise in event of multiple failures. For the purpose of demonstration of the effectiveness of its
passive features, postulated scenarios on the lines of three major severe accidents in the history of nuclear power reactors are
considered, namely; the Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Severe plant conditions along the lines
of these scenarios are postulated to the extent conceivable in the reactor under consideration and analyzed using best estimate
system thermal-hydraulics code RELAP5/Mod3.2. It is found that the various passive systems incorporated enable the reactor
to tolerate the postulated accident conditions without causing severe plant conditions and core degradation.
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AHWR design draws significantly from the past experiences
of operating reactors, the major accidents that have brought
renewed perspective to safety, and the foresight of emerging
threats to safety, particularly malevolent acts or sabotage.
This paper examines the capability of the reactor to with-
stand the accidents postulated along the lines of major
accidents in the history of nuclear power reactors, namely
the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents.
For the purpose of analysis, RELAP5/Mod3.2 was chosen
as a best estimate system thermal-hydraulic code. It may be
noted that this code has been extensively used for simula-
tions of transient and safety analysis of water-cooled reac-
tors in the past [2, 3]. Besides, the code has been extensively
validated with test data from several separate effect as well
as integral test facilities for water-cooled reactors [4, 5]. 
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
AHWR is a vertical pressure-tube type boiling water
reactor with heavy water as moderator and light water as
coolant (Fig. 1). The reactor is designed with the twin-
objectives of early development of the technologies relevant
to the third stage of the Indian Nuclear Power Programme
that aims at thorium utilization and the demonstration of
innovative passive safety features consistent with the safety
requirements of next generation reactors. Natural circulation
for core cooling under all conditions is the most prominent
passive feature. It eliminates all the scenarios of safety
significance that may result from the unavailability of
pumps. Table 1 shows the main design parameters of
AHWR.
A schematic of a natural circulation based heat transport
system of AHWR is shown in Fig. 2. The main heat trans-
port system (MHTS) is comprised of four identical parallel
loops connected to each other through a common header
and a common steam line supplying the steam to a turbine.
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Fig. 1. Schematic of AHWR with Various Passive Systems
Type
Moderator
Coolant
Core Orientation
Mode of Heat Removal
Rated Power
Stem Drum Pressure
Stem Drum Temperature
Number of Channels
Steam Drums (SD)
Header
Downcomer
Risers
Feeders
Core Height
Core Inlet Subcooling
Core Exit Quality
Pressure Tube Type BWR
Heavy Water
Boiling Light Water
Vertical
Natural Circulation
300 MWe (920MWth)
7 MPa
2850C
452
3.75 m Dia x 11 m Long (4 Nos.)
600 NB (Ring type)
300 NB Pipe (16Nos.)
125 NB Pipe (452 Nos.)
100 NB Pipe (452 Nos.)
3.5 m
25 K
18%
Table 1. Main Design Parameters of AHWR
627NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
JAIN et al., Role of Passive Safety Features in Prevention and Mitigation of Severe Plant Conditions in Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor
The header is connected to the core of the reactor through
feeders. The subcooled water that enters the reactor core
gets heated and leaves the core as two-phase flow. The
steam-water mixture leaving the core flows upward through
the risers, which are connected to the four horizontal steam
drums. The gravity based steam-water separation takes
place in the steam drums. The saturated steam leaving
the steam drums flows to the turbine through the steam
lines. The separated water in the steam drum mixes with
the subcooled feedwater entering through the feedwater
sparger in the inter-baffle region. This subcooled water
returns through the downcomer pipes to the common header
and thus completes the four natural circulation loops, each
catering to a quarter symmetric section of the core and
having a steam drum. The baffles separate the sections of
the steam drum connected to the risers and downcomer,
thus enabling the separation of steam and water. Each
feedwater line is provided with a flow control valve, which
is governed by a three-element based controller. The system
pressure is maintained by a valve located downstream in
the steam line i.e. turbine governor valve. Under normal
operating condition, the core power is 920 MWth. The
subcooled water enters the core at 260o C (25K subcooling)
and leaves as a steam-water mixture of 18% quality. Satu-
rated steam is produced at 70 bar that drives the turbine,
and the same mass flow rate of feedwater enters the steam
drum at 130o C. In addition, the AHWR design employs
many inherent and passive features [1] as mentioned below:
1. Slightly negative void reactivity coefficient
2. Passive isolation condenser system for decay heat
removal
3. Passive emergency core cooling 
4. Passive poison injection system to ensure shutdown
following failure of wired shut down systems 
5. Passive containment cooling
6. Passive containment isolation
7. Passive auto-depressurization system
2.1 Important Safety Systems in AHWR
2.1.1 Passive Decay Heat Removal System
Isolation condenser system (ICS) (Fig. 2) is comprised
of a set of immersed condensers in an elevated water pool
i.e. Gravity Driven Water Pool (GDWP), and associated
piping and valves [2]. ICS is essentially designed to remove
the decay heat in the event of an SBO or the unavailability
of the main condenser. Normally, the main condenser
serves as a decay heat removal system, however, in case
of the unavailability of the main condenser or SBO, the ICS
gets valved in. A branch connection from the steam line
carries the steam to a tube bundle of immersed condensers
through a distributor and top header. The steam condensation
takes place in the tube bundle and the condensate returns
to the downcomer region of the steam drum through a
bottom header and condensate return line. The condensate
return line is provided with a set of active and passive
valves in parallel. The heat removal capacity is regulated
using a passive valve where the valve opening is regulated
depending on steam drum pressure, thus maintaining hot
shutdown. The passive valve actuates directly on the
variation of steam drum pressure in a specified range.
The active valve (pneumatically operated) provided in
parallel serves the purpose of bringing the system to a cold
shutdown condition, if required. Under normal operation,
the valves remain closed, thus isolating the ICS from the
MHTS, and steam flows to the turbine circuit, whereas,
under shutdown conditions, the turbine is isolated from
the MHTS, the passive valve opens (and closes also) in
response to steam drum pressure, and a natural circulation
path is established between the MHTS and ICS.
2.1.2 Passive Emergency Core Cooling System
This is comprised of an injection of water directly
into the reactor core in three stages. In the first stage,
injection from an accumulator takes place on the MHTS
low-pressure signal (50 bar). In the second stage (MHTS
pressure 2 bar), the water flows under gravity from the
GDWP, providing core cooling for three days. In the third
stage, water accumulated in the reactor cavity is pumped
back to the GDWP, which eventually enters the core. The
first and second stages of emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) are passively actuated and do not depend on any
active component. Figure 3 shows the schematic arrange-
ment of ECCS of AHWR.
Fig. 2. Schematic of Main Heat Transport System and Passive
Decay Heat Removal System of AHWR
2.1.3 Passive Poison Injection System
This passive system injects the poison into the moderator
by using the increased steam drum pressure, in case of a
very low probability event of failure of both the wired
shutdown systems, accompanied with a transient involving
the unavailability of the heat sink. Figure 4 shows the
schematic of the passive poison injection system. AHWR
design has two independent shutdown systems, one com-
prising the mechanical shut off rods and the other employing
injection of a liquid poison into the low-pressure moderator.
Both the shutdown systems require active signals for shut-
down of the reactor.
3. POSTULATED ACCIDENT SCENARIOS WITH
POTENTIAL TO CAUSE SEVERE PLANT
CONDITIONS
In view of the importance of the few major accidents
in the history of the operating reactors, it is imperative to
demonstrate the safety of a new design against accidents
postulated along similar lines. The following sections aims
to bring out the highlights of the three major accidents,
without getting into the minute details, and draw a parallel
scenario for AHWR to the extent conceivable in such a
design. The accidents are described briefly with the aim
of postulating an appropriate sequence of similar events
for AHWR. 
Case I – Postulation of a Chernobyl Type Accident:
The Chernobyl accident was essentially a combination
of certain undesirable design features and a violation of
safety culture [6]. The RBMK design had a positive reac-
tivity coefficient, a faulty design of control rods, and lack
of containment structure. However, in spite of these design
deficiencies, RBMK reactors have successfully performed;
the precursor to the Chernobyl accident was in fact the
specific experiment that was conducted in gross violation
of safety culture, for example the bypassing of many safety
systems. The Chernobyl accident was the second major
accident after TMI, but it was the first accident in terms
of radioactivity release and serious impact on the public
perception towards nuclear electricity generation. The
reactor design had certain undesirable characteristics in
addition to those mentioned above, like use of graphite as
a moderator at such high temperatures, which is prone to
fire, and lack of containment envelop, which magnified
the consequences of the accident.   
Though the AHWR design incorporates a slightly
negative reactivity coefficient achieved by reactor physics
design based on tight lattice, and eliminates the possibility
of undesirable reactivity addition by limiting the maximum
worth of control rods, as well as the maximum speed of
drives, an attempt has been made to postulate a similar
scenario that may lead to inadvertent reactivity addition
in AHWR. This postulated scenario is particularly relevant
in case of malevolent acts where both the wired shutdown
systems are disabled and the main condenser is not available.
Besides, even a small negative void reactivity coefficient
may also lead to undesirable power excursion in case of
an inadvertent reactivity addition, thus justifying the need
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Fig. 3. Schematic Arrangement of ECCS of AHWR
Fig. 4. Schematic of Passive Poison Injection System of
AHWR
for assessing the reactor with passive systems to cope with
it safely.  
For the case of AHWR undergoing a similar initiating
event, it is postulated that the reactor is initially operating
at 30% full power with a high core inlet subcooling (31K),
such that it has entered into an unstable operation domain.
With the occurrence of instability, the reactor should have
tripped, based on signals from channel flow monitors and
local power range monitors (LPRM) employed in the core.
However, it is postulated that the operator has disabled
both the wired shutdown systems and regulating rods are
withdrawn to increase the power to enter into the stable
natural circulation domain. The reactivity addition takes
place at the maximum possible rate as permitted by the
design. 
Case II – Postulation of a TMI Type Accident:
The TMI accident [7] was in fact an outcome of over-
dependence on human intervention that led to erroneous
operator response, partly driven by faulty instrumentation
and a faulty diagnosis of the event. The accident highlighted
the severity of small break LOCA. The TMI accident
brought a paradigm shift in nuclear reactor technology,
highlighting the importance of passive safety over the
conventional practice of active safety and operator inter-
vention. At TMI, it was essentially a small break LOCA,
due to a stuck open power operated relief valve, such that
the reactor could not depressurize enough to activate the
emergency core cooling until late in the accident. Further,
with the faulty diagnosis of water level rise in the pressuriser,
the high-pressure injection was tripped by operator inter-
vention. The condition resulting from the stuck open relief
valve could have been managed with activation of engi-
neered safety systems provided in the design. However,
operator action essentially denied the actuation of ECCS
and in turn, a normal upset catapulted into an accident.
However, safety philosophy based on multiple barriers
precluded any significant release of radioactivity to the
operator and public. 
In AHWR, the main heat transport system is provided
with relief valves to prevent the over-pressurization in event
of partial or complete unavailability of the heat sink. For
the purpose of the simulation of a similar plausible accident
in AHWR, it is considered that the reactor is operating at
full power and experiences a sudden loss of feedwater with
a turbine trip. As a result, the reactor gets bottled up due
to the closure of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV). At
the same time, the isolation condenser system is considered
to be unavailable, which is very unlikely as the system is
passive in operation. However, it is postulated to deprive
the reactor of a heat sink as it happened at TMI due to the
unavailability of feedwater on the secondary side of steam
generators. This in turn leads to a situation where steam
drum pressure builds up to the set point of the safety relief
valve (SRV). However, the safety relief valve fails to reseat
and remains stuck open, causing a loss of coolant accident.
It may be noted that ECCS availability can be reasonably
justified, as its actuation is made passive by the incorporation
of a rupture disk. 
Case III – Postulation of a Fukushima Type Accident:
The Fukushima accident [8] was essentially an external
event induced accident that led to prolonged station blackout
(SBO). The beyond-design-basis earthquake induced
Tsunami caused not only the failure of the transmission
grid, but also drowned the diesel generator sets provided
to supply class III power in the event of a failure of class
IV power. In addition, the natural calamity rendered the
plant site inaccessible for several days to preclude external
intervention to rescue the situation and thus further aggra-
vated the accident. Though SBOs have always been consid-
ered in the reactor design and safety philosophy, the Fuku-
shima accident raised a question on the mission time that
the design must consider in view of such a prolonged SBO.
It may be noted that the plant withstood a beyond-design-
basis earthquake without any impact on the structural
integrity and the reactor could be safely shutdown, thus
demonstrating the reliability of the structural design and
shutdown system. In the context of AHWR, though the
Indian coasts are not prone to such Tsunamis because of
geographical factors, and layout provisions ensure the
safety of diesel generator sets, a prolonged SBO can be
postulated to demonstrate the robustness of the in-built
design features. It is postulated that there is a simultaneous
failure of class IV and III power supplies leading to the
closure of the Combined Isolation and Emergency Stop
Valve (CIESV) as well as loss of feedwater supply to the
steam drums. This condition is assumed to remain for several
days. It may be noted that the inlet to ICS is always in
communication with MHTS, whereas, a set of passive, as
well as active, valves are provided in parallel in the conden-
sate return line at the outlet of IC. The motor operated
valves provided are always open and closed only for the
purpose of isolation during the maintenance work. The
passive valve operation is governed by the steam drum
pressure, whereas the active valves are pneumatically
operated based on a fail-safe design such that it opens when
the pneumatic supply is exhausted. 
4. SYSTEM ANALYSIS FOR POSTULATED
ACCIDENTS
The reactor system has been analyzed using the best
estimate code RELAP5/Mod3.2 [9]. The code has been
successfully applied for simulation of passive systems of
AHWR by comparing the code predictions and test data
obtained from an integral test facility. For the purpose of
this analysis, following assumptions are made: 
1. All channels are lumped into a single channel
2. Point Kinetics model for reactor kinetics simulation
is considered 
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A nodalisation of the entire system comprising MHTS,
ECCS, ICS and Containment System has been developed
as shown in Fig. 5. Table 2 shows the initial conditions
and postulated initiating events for all the cases. 
4.1 Analysis for Case I - Chernobyl Type Accident
Initially the reactor is operating at 30% full power with
high core inlet subcooling (t < 0 s). This leads to core flow
oscillation as shown in Fig. 6. At t = 0 s, the operator
disables the wired shutdown systems and removes all
regulating rods to raise the power, so as to avoid unstable
operation. This leads to a reactivity addition of 11 mk in
900 s as shown in Fig. 7. Due to this, core power increases
rapidly with a corresponding increase in the steam gener-
ation rate, as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. It can
be seen that the core power reaches 1100 MW at t = 272 s.
However, at t = 245 s, the steam flow exceeds the 140%
of the rated steam flow, causing the closure of main steam
Case I
Initial conditions at t = 0
Postulating Initiating Events
t = 0 s    Wired Shutdown system disabled
t = 0 s     Reactivity insertion started
Postulating Initiating Events
t = 0 s,  loss of feed water
Relief valve stuck open 
Postulating Initiating Events
t = 0 s Loss of Class IV and Class III power 
(Prolonged station blackout)
t = 0 s, reactor SCRAM
Parameter
Nominal Power (% FP)
SD pressure
Core inlet subcooling
Value
30 (unstable condition)
70 bar
31 K
Case II
Initial conditions at t = 0
Parameter
Nominal Power (% FP)
SD pressure
Feedwater /Steam flow rate
Inlet subcooling
Value
100
70 bar
404 kg/s
26 K
Case III
Initial conditions at t = 0
Parameter
Nominal Power (% FP)
SD pressure
Feed/Steam flow rate
Inlet subcooling
Value
100
70 bar
404 kg/s
26 K
Table 2. Initial and Boundary Conditions for All the Cases
Fig. 5. RELAP5 Nodalisation of AHWR
Fig. 6. Core Mass Flow Rate at 30% Full Power Condition for
Chernobyl-like Accident
isolation valve, as shown in Fig. 9. Due to the bottled up
condition of the reactor, the steam drum pressure rises
rapidly. The evolution of steam drum pressure during the
accident is shown in Fig. 10. As the wired shutdown systems
are not available, the corresponding reactor trips of high
pressure are ignored. However, the isolation condenser
system gets valved in as the passive valve starts opening
at 76.5 bar. Since the isolation condenser is designed to
remove the decay heat, the pressure continues to rise until
the passive valve opens fully at 79.5 bar. Later, when
pressure exceeds 80 bar, the active valve also opens at t =
263.8 s, as shown in Fig. 11. Further, due to the mismatch
of heat generation in the core and heat rejection through
ICs, as shown in Fig. 12, the steam pressure rises to 83 bar
at t= 270 s. At this time, the passive poison injection system
actuates on the bursting of the rupture disk, and ensures
the reactor scram in a period of 2 seconds by injection of
poison into the moderator. Subsequently, the reactor cooling
is ensured by the isolation condenser system. The effect
of a power excursion on the fuel elements can be observed
from the Figs. 13 and 14, showing maximum clad surface
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Fig. 7. Reactivity Insertion Rate for Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 10. Steam Drum Pressure Following Rod Withdrawal
Transient for Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 11. Valve Opening with Pressure Evolution for
Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 8. Core Power Following Rod Withdrawal Transient for
Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 9. Steam Flow Rate Following Rod Withdrawal Transient
for Chernobyl-like Accident
temperature and maximum fuel centerline temperature
during the course of the transient, respectively. It shows
that peak clad temperature reaches only to 585 K, whereas
the maximum centerline temperature is found to be 1465
K, ensuring no loss of integrity in the fuel. 
The above analysis not only indicates the capability
of the reactor to withstand such a reactivity excursion as
a result of a deliberate action or otherwise, but also signifies
the role of the negative void reactivity coefficient, limitations
on the reactivity insertion rate by way of limited worth, and
the speed of the drives. Most importantly, it demonstrates
the role of passive poison injection system in ensuring
the reactor scram, on the basis of steam drum pressure in
the event of a failure of two physically and functionally
independent wired shutdown systems.     
4.2 Analysis for Case II - TMI Type Accident
With the reactor operating at nominal operating condi-
tions, at t = 0 s, sudden loss of feedwater is postulated. As
a result, the turbine is tripped and the main steam isolation
valve closes, resulting in a bottled up condition of the reactor.
As the pressure rises, the reactor trips on the high-pressure
signal at a steam drum pressure of 76 bar. At the same time,
the unavailability of isolation condensers is also postulated.
Thus, a complete loss of the heat sink occurs, that leads
to pressurization of MHTS under decay heat. Figure 15
shows the steam drum pressure during the course of the
transient. It can be seen that the pressure continues to rise
to the set point of the safety relief valve mounted in the
steam line. The safety relief valve is considered to remain
stuck open, resulting in a loss of coolant accident. The
safety relief valve discharges into the GDWP, the steam
from MHTS condenses, causing depressurization of
MHTS. At MHTS pressure of 50 bars, the accumulators
get valved in and the first phase of ECCS injection initiates.
Figure 16 shows the accumulator water level during the
phase. However, accumulators gets isolated at t =12500 s
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Fig. 13. Clad Surface Temperature Following Rod Withdrawal
Transient for Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 14. Maximum Fuel Centerline Temperature during
Transient for Chernobyl-like Accident
Fig. 15. SD Pressure and Reactor Power for TMI-like
Accident
Fig. 12. Comparison of Reactor Power and Heat Loss through
ICS for Chernobyl-like Accident
on account of the low accumulator level and the system
pressure reduces. Subsequently, the second phase of the
ECCS injection initiates, which is comprised of water
injection from GDWP at the time when MHTS pressure
reaches 2 bars. With valving in of GDWP, MHTS and
GDWP are in communication forming a loop such that
the steam condenses in GDWP and the same amount of
water enters the core as emergency core coolant. Figure 17
shows the steam flow leaving the SRV. The GDWP water
temperature rises for the period of 3 days, as shown in
Fig. 18. The maximum clad surface temperature during
the course of transient is shown in Fig. 19. It can be seen
that maximum clad surface temperature is 575K, which
is well within the safety limits.            
4.3 Analysis for Case III - Fukushima Type Accident
Initially (t < 0) the reactor is operating at rated conditions
and at t = 0 s, there is an earthquake which induces an SBO.
The reactor trips safely on the earthquake signal. As a
result of this initiating event, the feedwater supply to the
steam drum is not available, and the combined isolation
and emergency stop valve gets closed, thus leading the
reactor to a bottled-up condition. The evolution of the steam
drum pressure during the accident is shown in Fig. 20. It
can be seen that, initially the steam drum pressure rises until
the isolation condenser system gets passively valved-in at
76.5 bar. The hot shutdown passive valve maintains the
pressure, however, the active valves in parallel to the
passive valves also open with a delay of half an hour on
the unavailability of compressed air due to the fail-safe
design feature. Subsequently, the reactor depressurizes
and decay heat removal continues through the isolation
condensers using the GDWP water. Figure 21 shows the
comparison of heat removed through the IC and heat
transferred to coolant in the core. As the heat removal rate
thorough IC exceeds the heat transferred to the coolant in
the core, the main heat transport system continues to depres-
surize. It leads to pressure falling below 50 bar at t=2180 s
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Fig. 16. Accumulator and GDWP Water Level for TMI-like
Accident
Fig. 17. SRV Discharge Flow Rate for TMI-like Accident 
Fig. 18. GDWP Water Temperature for TMI-like Accident
Fig. 19. Maximum Clad Surface Temperature for TMI-like
Accident
thus initiating accumulator injection. Accumulators become
exhausted at t= 9380 s as shown in Fig. 22. It may be noted
that, ECCS injection is available in a passive manner as
actuation is based on the bursting of the rupture disks.
It can be seen that due to the huge inventory of water
in GDWP, it is possible to remove the decay heat only
with the sensible heating of the GDWP water for nearly
10 days. Figure 23 shows the GDWP temperature rise.
With boiling of GDWP water, decay heat can be removed
for many more days. However, with boiling of GDWP
water, the containment pressurization takes place that may
require venting. Containment pressure evolution is shown
in Fig. 24. It may be noted that during such a case, the
containment can be vented without any impact on the
public, as there is no activity release in the containment.
The maximum clad surface temperature during the accident
is found to be 575K (Fig. 25), which is well within the
safety limits.         
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Fig. 21. Comparison of Core and IC Heat Removal Rate
during Fukushima-like Accident
Fig. 23. GDWP Water Temperature during Fukushima-like Accident
Fig. 22. Accumulator Water Level during Fukushima-like
Accident
Fig. 20. Steam Drum Pressure Variation during Fukushima-
like Accident
5. CONCLUSION
The above analysis reveals that due to the integration
of many passive systems to meet the fundamental safety
functions, AHWR design can withstand the multiple failures
without compromising the fuel integrity, and hence any
radiological impact onsite as well as offsite. The progression
of the accidents also reveals the simplifications brought
in the design by the passive systems. Various enabling
features that make the system cope with major severe
accidents may be identified as:
• Negative void reactivity coefficient
• Limitation on inadvertent reactivity insertion rate 
• Natural circulation for core heat removal 
• Passive decay heat removal through ICs
• Passive emergency core cooling system
• Use of passive valves and rupture disks
• Presence of a large heat sink at high elevation inside
containment in form of GDWP
• Protection against malevolent act by use of passive
poison injection to ensure safe shutdown in the very
unlikely event of failure of both the shutdown
systems
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